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I. RACIST SPEECH AS AN ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Racism is certainly not a new phenomenon, but it is a comparatively new issue of constitutional law. This is particularly true in one respect: rules against hate speech emerged about as recently as the judicial
review of speech regulation.
A.

The Emergence of Hate Speech Regulation

Specific laws against racist hate speech are largely a product of the
second half of the twentieth century. In part, their origins are shaped by
the specific national experience. This is particularly obvious in Germany, where its approach is primarily dictated by the trauma of the
Holocaust. 2 The emergence of new statutes and their repeated amendments 3 can be understood as a complex response to the darkest chapter
in German history-admitting collectively that it happened, trying to
establish safeguards against any possible recurrence, and protecting the
emotions of the new Jewish communities within the country. At the

1. For a comprehensive examination, see the national reports in STRIKING A BALANCE:
HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 75-295 (Sandra Coliver ed.,
1992) [hereinafter STRIKING A BALANCE].
2. See generally Eric Stein, HistoryAgainst Free Speech: The New Gennan Law Against
the "Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies," 85 MICH. L. REv. 277 (1986) (discussing the history of

German hate speech legislation).
3. See infra Part Fl.A.
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same time, the German example has inspired legislation in other countries. The Canadian rules, for example, have been based on the careful
studies of the Cohen Committee.4 One of the Committee's arguments,
advocating penal sanctions for hate speech, was based on the premise
that the "successes of modem advertising, the triumph of impudent
propaganda such as Hitler's, have qualified sharply our belief in the rationality of man."5
There are other roots to the emergence of anti-hate statutes, includmore recent acts of racist violence in Europe, which can be atthe
ing
tributed to social change, generated by increasing mobility. 6 The addition of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity to the formerly more
homogeneous European societies has generated hatred toward such targets (apart from asylum-seekers) as Turks and Vietnamese in Germany;
North Africans in France and Italy; Asians and Africans in the United
Kingdom; and gypsies in Spain, Romania, and the former Czechoslovakia. Older conflicts proliferate beyond their traditional boundaries.
Violence between Turks and Curds, and between Serbs, Croates, and
Bosnian Muslims mushroom throughout the continent. Thus, legislation
against hate speech is equally a response to violent conflicts nurtured by
increasing social diversity.
B. ConstitutionalReview of Speech Regulation
New laws are, however, merely one side of the new legal issue.
The other novelty is that the statutes, ordinances, and regulations banning racist hate speech are often in conflict with constitutional protections of free speech and are, therefore, threatened with invalidation by
judicial review. With the exception of the United States, the endowment
of judges with the power to enforce civil rights against acts of parliamentary legislation is a recent addition to constitutional law. The German Federal Constitutional Court, established by the post war constitution, the "Basic Law" since 1949, follows the American example and

4. The Cohen Committee was established by the Minister of Justice and headed by Dean
Maxwell Cohen of McGill University School of Law. See Thomas David Jones, Human Rights:
Freedom of Expression and Group Defamation Under British, Canadian,Indian, Nigerian and
United States Law-A ComparativeAnalysis, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'LL. REv. 427,455 (1995).
5. MAXWELL COHEN, REPORT TO THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON HATE PROPAGANDA 8 (1966) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMIEE].

6. See Paul Gordon, Racist Violence: The Expression of Hate in Europe, in STRIKING A
BALANCE, supra note 1, at 9, 9-17. For an analysis of the increase of hate speech in the United
States, see Frederick Schauer, The Sociology of the Hate Speech Debate, 37 VILL. L. REV. 805,
808-12 (1992).
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has served as a model for the new democracies in Eastern Europe. In
addition, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") has set up its own system of judicial review which, by now, applies throughout the continent.
In addition to this institutional change, the emergence of constitutional courts has been accompanied by a still more pervasive change of
legal substance. This change has been particularly obvious in the United
States. In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court has the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against legislative restrictions, it was generally
understood and accepted that free speech was limited by both traditional
and new rules protecting reputation, morals, public peace, and other
goods or interests. For nearly two centuries, there could be no doubt that
only socially acceptable speech was entitled to constitutional protection.
The most obvious example is provided by defamation. It was not until
the 1960s that the Supreme Court, in the landmark decision New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,7 began to rewrite the law of slander and libel
along lines derived from a new interpretation of the First Amendment.
This case had been preceded by a comparable decision of the German
Federal Constitutional Court, the Liith opinion,' redefining traditional
private law restrictions of free speech under the impact of the constitutional guarantee of free expression in Article 5 of the Basic Law. The
German Court cited the United States Supreme Court, defining freedom
of expression as "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom."9 The European Court of Human Rights
followed suit a few years later, rejecting the traditional application of
Austrian defamation law as a violation of the free speech guarantee
provided by Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.°
C. The Example of Defamation
These judicial developments have set the stage for the debate on
the compatibility of racist speech bans with constitutional guarantees of

7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958). For a comprehensive discussion of this opinion, see DAVID P.
CuRRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 184-89 (1994); Edward J.
Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 797, 808-27
(1997); Peter E. Quint, FreeSpeech and PrivateLaw in German ConstitutionalTheory, 48 MD. L.
REV. 247,252-90 (1989).
9. 7 BVerfGE at 208 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)).
10. See Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), available at
<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudoe1doehejud\sift\108.txt>.
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free speech. In order to illustrate the specific problem to be discussed in
this Article, it seems useful to return for a moment to the defamation
cases previously mentioned." Although the decisions differ in many respects, they show striking similarities, particularly in their concern with
racial issues. In New York Times, the Supreme Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling which suppressed a newspaper article offering public support for the civil rights movement in the South.12 In
Lfth, the German court annulled a decision from below enjoining the
appeal to boycott a film director who, under the Nazi regime, had produced an anti-Semitic propaganda movie. 3 In Lingens, the European
Court of Human Rights invalidated the verdict directed against an Austrian journalist for criticizing Austrian Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, a Jew, for minimizing and defending the Nazi past of one of his
cabinet ministers. And it is no less remarkable that all three courts operated very much along the same lines. In each case, the decision of the
lower courts had been based on traditional rules of speech regulation.
Through the exercise of constitutional law review, the reach of these
speech-restricting rules was considerably limited, but the torts of libel
or boycott were by no means abolished."5 There appears to exist a common understanding by all three courts, providing for a "common
ground" of reasoning and thus for a common approach to the issue.
Public figures can no longer use criminal or tort law in order to deter
others from criticizing their ideas, manifestations, performance, or other
behavior. However, even the most prominent and the most powerful are
not obliged to tolerate malicious falsities and distortions. There persists
a core element of protection for an individual's reputational interests,
which proves to be resistant even against the demands of public discourse. This harmony has considerable merits (which may be more obvious in other countries than the United States). The "common ground"
makes the judicial intervention still more persuasive and thus strengthens the position of the courts.
This common approach appears even more remarkable when reactions to racist hate speech are considered. Part II describes the widely
11. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
12. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,264 (1964).
13. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) at 198, 199.
14. See Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 11-15.
15. For a careful comparative discussion, see GEORG NOLTE, BELEIDIGUNGSSCHUTZ IN DER
FREIHEITLICHEN DEMOKRATiE (1992) (describing how the impact of freedom of speech by constitutional adjudication has changed the traditional patterns of defamation law); Gregory H. Fox &
Georg Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies,36 HARV. INT.'L L.J. 1 (1995) (analyzing differences in the
American and German approaches).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:335

contrasting positions adopted by American and German law. This divergence is even more significant in light of international law asking for
state action against extreme forms of racist hate speech; this is explained in Part 1H. Part IV maps out a conceptual framework which
might be useful for the elaboration of a more harmonious understanding. Part V shows how some courts have engaged in the task of providing for a more differentiated approach. This approach may serve as a
model, not for solutions, but for a convergence of basic attitudes, without restraining the discretion of paying respect to differing national
traditions and needs.
II.

LEGISLATION AND JUDICIAL REvIEW: THE DIVERGING
WAYS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF GERMANY

A.

The Expanding Statutory Framework in Germany

How has the German legal system reacted to racist speech? I propose to distinguish four starting points in the development of pertinent
rules.
The first approach has been based on the general provisions of
criminal and civil law protecting individual integrity against insult,
defamation, and similar forms of verbal aggression.1 6 This segment of
German law is based on a rigorous distinction between statements of
fact and expressions of opinion. Criminal sanctions are imprisonment
and fines; the civil sanctions include damages, injunctions not to repeat
an illegal attack, and the imposition of the duty to retract or correct an
untrue statement of fact. There are many cases where these rules operate
in a satisfactory manner, particularly where the courts have to deal with
the exchange of insulting or fighting words between individuals or small
groups facing each other in a local conflict. But there have been and still
exist serious difficulties in coping with public statements of a general
nature attacking and degrading anonymous collectives like "the Jews"
or "the Turks." In many cases, the courts have had to struggle with "the
Auschwitz lie"-the denial of the fact that the Holocaust occurred.

16. See §§ 185, 186, 189 StGB (F.R.G.) (Penal Code) (prohibiting insults to a person's
honor; damage to reputation consisting of factual statements insulting a third person; and disparaging the memory of the dead, respectively); §§ 823, 824, 826 BGB (F.R.G.) (Civil Code)
(prohibiting intentional or negligent infringement on the life, body, health, freedom, property, or
other rights of another person; endangerment of a third person's credit; and willfully causing damage to another in a manner contrary to public policy, respectively).
17. I owe information and understanding to the excellent discussion by Klaus GUnther,
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This fact situation raises several issues.
First, civil litigation requires an action brought by a plaintiff. In
addition, German criminal law links the prosecution of insulting or defamatory statements to an application or petition made by the injured
person. In most of the cases dealing with denials of the Holocaust, there
was neither an action nor an application by any of the individuals or organizations which could be viewed as injured or at least as concerned.
For this reason, the Penal Code was amended in 1985.8 The new rule
allows the public prosecution of an insulting or defamatory public
statement whenever the injured person belongs to a group which had
been a victim of the Nazi or of another totalitarian or lawless regime. At
the same time, this group has to be part of the German population, and
the insult or defamation has to be related to the prosecution by the regime. 9 In addition, the Penal Code now allows the application to be
made by relatives or descendants of the victims; even in such a case,
prosecution can be initiated ex officio.20
Another problem has been determining under which circumstances
the integrity of an individual is affected by disparaging expressions directed only against her group as a whole. Where anti-Semitic propaganda was under review, the German courts refused to punish insulting
or defamatory expressions addressed to "the Jews" or other groups in
general.2' It was only after the defeat of the Nazi regime that these
precedents were overruled.' The reasons for this modification of a wellestablished principle have been carefully explained by the highest private law court (Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen). It is the fact of the
common destiny, the experience of the persecution by the Nazi regime,
which has generated a new identity not only of those who have survived, but also of their descendants living within Germany including

Criminal Law Against Anti-Semitism: The Denial of the Holocaust (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Author).
18. See Stein, supranote 2, at 305-14 (detailing the legislative process involved in the 1985
amendment to the Penal Code).
19. See StGB art. 194(1)(2) (F.R.G.) (Penal Code). This rule requires, in addition, that the
statement has been distributed in writing or print or by broadcast or that it has been made in an
assembly. See id.
20. See StGB art. 194(2).
21. See Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts (RG Repr.) 3, 606; Reichsgericht in Goldtdammer's Archiv fir Strafrecht (RG GA) 75, 295, 298.
22. See Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen (BGHSt) 11, 207 (holding that the 30,000 Jews
presently living in Germany and formerly persecuted by the Nazis formed a sufficiently defined
group for the purposes of Article 185); Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 75, 160
(recognizing Jews as a legally articulable group and "Jewishness" as a legally defensible identity).
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those born after 1945.2' These decisions reflect a more general change in
the attitude of German courts. Today, they are much more ready to grant
protection against attacks on reputation and similar interests addressed
exclusively against groups or organizations. The most recent controversy has been triggered by car stickers claiming that "soldiers are murderers." Germany continues to struggle with the question of whether
this can be punished as a defamation of all soldiers serving in the German army. 24
A final problem has been explaining why a pure and simple denial
of the fact of the Holocaust should constitute an insult or defamation of
Jews living in Germany. Again, the most elaborate answer has been
given by the Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen.2' A defendant had publicly denounced the Holocaust as a "Zionist lie." The Federal Court
confirmed an injunction issued by a lower court ordering defendant not
to repeat this statement. The main issue was why the plaintiff, the
grandson of a Jew killed in Auschwitz, should have standing to ask for
such an injunction. The court reasoned that the Nazi prosecution provided the Jewish community in Germany with a new and specific identity which determines the relationship between individual German Jews
and individual other Germans. For this reason, denying the Holocaust
amounts to a refusal to respect the suffering of the victims and their
relatives and to pay the esteem owed to the German Jews as a distinguishable group. For the Jewish part of the German population, this respect and esteem is an indispensable condition for living in Germany
and a guarantee that anti-Semitic discrimination and prosecution will
not happen again. 26
The difficulties of applying the general rules protecting individual
integrity and reputation to the "Auschwitz lie" have been a major reason
to look for more specific remedies against racist hate speech. As a result, section 130 of the Penal Code ("StGB") was amended-in fact
completely rewritten-in 1960. The original version of the rule had
been introduced in the late nineteenth century in order to protect public
peace against "incitement to class struggle."27 The new section 130 now
reads:
23. See
BGHZ
75,
160;
MARKUS
WVEHINGER,
KOLLEKTIVBELEIDIGUNGVOLKSVERHETZUNG 38 (1994).
24. See GEORG NOLTE, "SOLDATEN SiND MRDER"--EuRopAiSCH BETRACHTET 313 (Archiv
ftir Pressserecht, 1996).
25. See]BGHZ75, 160.
26. See BGHZ 75, 160 (161-63).
27. GUnther, supra note 17, at 11; see also FRANZ STRENG, DAS UNRECHT DER
VoLKsvERHErzuNG 501 (Festschrift for Lackner 1987).
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"Whosoever attacks the human dignity of others in a manner liable to
disturb the public peace by:
1. inciting hatred against a certain part of the population,
2. inciting to violent or arbitrary acts against such part of the population, or
3. insulting, maliciously ridiculing or defaming such part,

shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of not less than three
months and not exceeding five years. '
Under this rule, speech could be punished only if the following
three conditions were met:
(1) There had to be an act of hateful or degrading speech directed
against "part of the population," that is, a group within Germany.
(2) The act was an attack against the human dignity of others. It is
generally-and correctly-assumed that a violation of human dignity
requires more than mere criticism of behavior (in a broad sense). Human dignity is affected when and where the identity as a human being,
the basic right to be part of the human community, is denied to persons. A typical example is provided by the European Court of Human
Rights in Jersildv. Denmark,0 where ethnic minorities were compared
to animals, with the implication that they should be eliminated from the
community.
(3) Finally, the message had to involve a threat to the preservation
of public peace. This element recalls that the original purpose of the rule
had been the protection not of individual rights, but of a public good.
The 1960 amendment introduced a certain ambiguity, as threats to public peace could only be punished if they involved an attack against human dignity. The combination of the two elements certainly narrowed
the field of application of the new rule.
The court decisions rendered on this version of section 130 again
show a clear emphasis on anti-Semitic propaganda. Traditional hate acts
did not present serious problems for the courts. Pamphlets charging "the
Jews" collectively with all sorts of conspiracies and crimes3' as well as
28. Rainer Hofmann, Incitement to National and Racial Hatred: The Legal Situation in
Germany, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 159, 163 n.16.
29. This distinction is explained by the Titanic decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.
See 86 BVerfGE 1 (1992). In a satirical article, a disabled young man who had insisted on performing military service had been called a "cripple" as well as a (potential) "murderer." The latter
term he had to tolerate as it referred to his behavior; the former interfered with his human dignity
as it degraded him by reason of his physical condition.
30. 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1994), available at<http://www.dhcour.coe.frlhudocl
ViewHtml.a...e=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0&X=116194655>; see infra Part V.B.
31. See BGHSt 16, 49 (holding that an anti-Semitic tract about a banker's conspiracy in the
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putting a sticker saying nothing but "Jew" on the election posters of a
candidate running for political office could be equally punished. 2
Again, it was the "revisionist" agitation, the denial of the Holocaust,
which proved to be a troubling problem. The highest criminal court
(Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen) introduced the distinction between
the "simple Auschwitz lie" and the "qualified Auschwiz lie."" The
simple lie is the mere denial of the Holocaust, which is deemed an insult
to the Jews living in Germany but not an attack on their human dignity.
The simple lie cannot, therefore, be punished under section 130. The
language used by the court is certainly not very appealing. But the basic
idea that the mere denial of a historical event, even if made maliciously,
does not by itself amount to a violation of human dignity has some
merit. In fact, the distinction between the "simple" and the "qualified"
lie was used until 1994. At that time, the court decided the Deckert
case.' Deckert, the local chairman of an extremist right wing party, had
invited American Fred Leuchter to speak as an "expert" on concentration camps and gas chambers. Deckert translated and commented on the
presentation by Leuchter and, for this reason, he was convicted by a
panel of the local court under section 130. On appeal, the Federal Court
reversed the lower judge's holding that it was not sufficiently established that Deckert had expressed a "qualified Auschwitz lie"; the case
was remanded to another panel of the same local court. This panel affirmed the conviction under section 130, but in sentencing, it demonstrated an embarrassing and even shocking amount of sympathy with
Deckert and his motives, granting him release on probation. On appeal
by the public prosecutor, the sentence was corrected by the Federal
Court." But this was not enough to dampen the shock and the outrage
about the incident. As a result of this controversy, section 130 was included in a pending criminal law reform bill and thus amended again in
the same year.
The new version of section 130 is more complicated. Its relevant
parts read:
(1) Whosoever, in a manner liable to disturb the public peace,
(a) incites hatred against parts of the population or invites violence or
United States was hostile to the Constitution and inspired hatred).
32. See BGHSt 21, 371. But even these cases show that the courts tend to give a broad
reading to the notion of "public peace."
33. See BGHSt 31,226; BGH Neue Zeitschrift fMr Strafrecht (NStZ) 1994, 140,
34. See BGHSt 40, 97 = Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1994, 1421 = NStZ 1994,
390 (annotated by Jtirgen Baumann) = Strafverteidiger (StV) 1994, 538 (annotated by Glnther
Jacobs), abstractavailableat <http:/www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/abstracts/deckert.htnil>.
35. See BGH NJW 1995,340.
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arbitrary acts against them, or
(b)attacks the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously degrading or defaming parts of the population shall be punished by imprisonment of no less than three months and not exceeding five years.
(2) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years, or fine will be the punishment for whoever
(a) distributes,
(b) makes available to the public,
(c) makes available to persons of less than 18 years, or
(d) produces, stores or offers for use as mentioned in letters (a) to (c)
documents inciting hatred against part of the population or against
groups determined by nationality, race, religion, or ethnic origin, or
inviting to violent or arbitrary acts against these parts or groups, or attacking the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously ridiculing or defaming parts of the population or such a group, or
(e) distributes a message of the kind described in (1) by broadcast.
(3) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years or fine, will be the punishment for whoever, in public or in an assembly, approves, denies or
minimizes an act described in section 220a paragraph 1 committed under the regime of National-socialism, in a manner which is liable to
disturb the public peace.31
This amendment has considerably enlarged the field of application
of section 130 and thus intensified the conflict with the constitutional
guarantee for freedom of expression. The basic rule of paragraph (1)
provides for the punishment of racial speech without additionally requiring an attack on human dignity, but it retains the requirement of a threat
to public peace. Paragraph (2) prohibits the production and distribution
of racist materials by print or by the electronic media. It refers neither to

human dignity, nor to public peace. Paragraph (3) is obviously designed
to cover the "simple" Holocaust lie. A threat to the public peace is still

36. StGB art. 130 (F.R.G.) (Penal Code) (translation by Author). StGB art. 220a(1) (F.R.G.)
(Penal Code) states:
"Whoever, with the intention of wholly or partially destroying a national, racial, religious or ethnically distinct group as such,
1. kills a member of a group;
2. inflicts serious physical or mental injury... on members of a group;
3. subjects the group to living conditions likely to cause death to all or some of the
members;
4. imposes measures designed to prevent births within the group;
5. forcibly transfers children from one group to another,
shall be punished by imprisonment for life."
David E. Weiss, Note, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting the Threat of Neo-Nazism in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 899, 927 n.206 (1994)

(alteration in original).
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required, but not an attack on human dignity. It is not only the denial,
but also the approval and the minimization, of the Holocaust which is
threatened with criminal sanctions. "Approval" and "minimization" do
not constitute (untrue) statements of fact, but rather expressions of an
opinion. These notions thus are confronted with additional questions as
to their compatibility with the constitutional free speech guarantee.37
Restrictions on racist speech are not limited to criminal and civil
law; the government can be allowed to intervene by using its administrative law instruments. There is one case which is important primarily
due to the fact that the final decision was made by the Federal Constitutional Court." A right wing party had been preparing a public conference with David Irving, an Englishman engaged in pseudo-scientific
agitation against the fact of the Holocaust. The Munich city government
allowed the conference but, by a specific administrative order, burdened
the organizer with the duty of preventing any violation of section 130.
The order was affirmed by the local and regional administrative courts.
A constitutional complaint brought by the organizer was rejected as unfounded by the Federal Constitutional Court. The opinion states, without engaging in a more profound discussion, that denying the Holocaust
is an untrue statement of fact, and that untrue statements of fact do not
enjoy the protection of article 5, the free speech guarantee of the German constitution, if the falsity is known to the speaker or if it has been
established by proof The court did not discuss if speech rights of the
organizer are affected when he is charged with the responsibility for
everything that is said during a conference. But, in any case, the decision affirmed that the constitutionality of section 130, in its old version,
was not doubted.
A final consideration-normally not discussed in this context-is
broadcasting regulation. This field of law is exclusively reserved to
legislation by the states (Bundeslaender). They enact the rules regulating public as well as private broadcasting either by statute or by interstate agreement having the rank of statute. The basic principles are now
established in a "Broadcasting Interstate Agreement" formed in 1991
and amended in 1996 by accord of all the states." Article 3, paragraph 1,
37. This is discussed by Daniel Beisel, Die Strafbarkeit der Ausschwitzlilge, NJW 1995, 997
ff.; Stefan Huster, Das Verbot der "Auschwitzltige," die Meinungsfreiheit und das Bundesverfassungsgericht, NJW 1996, 487 ff. The narrower issue of artistic expression of racist ideas is examined by DANIEL BEISEL, DIE KUNSTFREIHErrSGARANTIE DES GRUNDGESEI7_,S UND MRE
SntA mECfrHICHEN GRENZEN 335-45 (1997).
38. See 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994).
39. See id. at 248-49.
40. See Dritter Staatsvertrag zur Anderung rundfunkrechtlicher StaatsvertrNge vom
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number 1 of this agreement prohibits programs
which incite hatred against parts of the population or against a group
which is determined by nationality, race, religion, or ethnic origin, or
which propagate violence and discrimination against such parts or
groups, or which attack the human dignity of others by4 1insulting, maliciously ridiculing or defaming parts of the population.
Some of the local statutes refer to this provision, while others have retained their own language. Quite often, these statutes stipulate that programs inciting race hatred or glorifying violence against others are intolerable. 42 The aspects that these rules have in common is that they
have never been contested before a court or another forum, and that they
are strictly obeyed. The public broadcasting system has completely abstained from any reprehensible broadcasting, and, to date, there do not
seem to have been any serious problems with commercial broadcasters
either.
B. The Narrowing Impact of Constitutional
Adjudication in the United States
As compared with Germany, the American response to hate speech
presents a dramatically different scenario. In the United States, the issues of law and policy generated by the phenomenon of racist hate
speech have inspired abounding academic literature. Its volume may
well, and its intensity and depth certainly do, exceed what has been
written in all other countries combined. 43 However, there is no federal or
26.8/11.9.1996 (Dritter Rundfunkinderungsstaatsvertrag), reprinted in MEDIA PERSPEKTIVEN
DOKMIENTATION (1996).
41. This translation was provided by the Author based upon a document in his possession.
42. See, e.g., Sec. 8 Par. 1 no. 1 Staatsvertrag fUr das Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen (ZDFStV).
43. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIEs,
AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH (1995); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, The
Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992);
Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 207 (1993); Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U.
CI. L. REv. 413 (1996); Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and
the Subordinationof Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95; Charles R. Lawrence II, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Robert
C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the FirstAmendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING
OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIvil RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 115 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. et al. eds.,
1994); John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9
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uniform legislation addressing racist hate speech. The occasional and
differing regulations enacted by states and by local communities have
repeatedly come under judicial review. The emphasis has been, therefore, much less focused on rulemaking than on corrective adjudication.
The attitude of the courts, in particular the Supreme Court, has changed
over time. There are several steps to be distinguished.
Significant constitutional adjudication based on the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment began with World War I. The activities
of pacifists and other opponents to the military involvement of the
United States were viewed as violations of the Espionage Act. The Supreme Court regularly affirmed the verdicts rendered by the lower
courts,' applying a standard that was explained, with particular clarity,
by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States.4 The defendant there
had been involved in the distribution of leaflets advocating opposition
and resistance to the draft; He challenged his punishment as violative of
the First Amendment: "It well may be that the prohibition of laws
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,
although to prevent them may have been the main purpose ... . ,,6 However, under the circumstances of war, the verdict was upheld, as "the
words used" were "of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent."47 Later decisions indicate that war was not the only
circumstance justifying penal sanctions against extremist political
speech; Communist propaganda calling for the violent overthrow of the
existing government was found to be equally compatible with the standard of clear and present danger. 4' At this stage, statutes and other
(1996).
44. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For earlier developments in First Amendment adjudication, see David M. Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE
L.J 514 (1981). The extent to which the First Amendment was understood as a ban only on prior
restraints is shown by Justice Holmes' opinion in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462
(1907).
45. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
46. Id. at 51-52.
47. Id. at 52.
48. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), overruled in partby Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925); see also OWEN M. FIss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
MANY USES OF STATE POWER 115 (1996) ("[IThe Supreme Court has been measured in its protection of subversive advocacy. Communists were allowed to engage in the general advocacy of
revolution, but the Court drew the line when advocacy turned into incitement."). For a particularly
critical comment, see Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation:Posner's and Rorty's Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 145
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regulations were allowed to proscribe the expression of ideas whenever
the language used presented such a "clear and present" threat to the
good the legislature wanted to protect.
However, a next step, probably encouraged by the famous dissenting and concurring opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis,4 9 led to
much more restrictive standards derived from the First Amendment. In
Cantwell v. Connecticut,50 the defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was
convicted under a state statute which, inter alia, protected the public
peace, for aggressively propagating his religion in a Roman Catholic
neighborhood.' In reversing the verdict, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the state was allowed to prohibit "words likely to produce violence
in others," but that defendant's conduct, "did not amount to a breach of
the peace. 52 At the end of the opinion, the Court addressed the phenomenon of racist speech. Although the importance of free speech
rights was emphasized, the Court concluded: '
There are limits to the exercise of these liberties. The danger in these
times from the coercive activities of those who in the delusion of racial
or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in
order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits [what] the States appropriately may punish.53
The new approach became more obvious in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.4 The defendant, again a Jehovah's Witness proselytizing on
a public street, called the city marshall "'a God damned racketeer"' and
a "'damned Fascist"' during a dispute with the police.55 His conviction
under a state statute protecting public peace was affirmed, but the
state's powers to regulate speech were now described by the Court in a
narrower way:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and

(1996) ("[W]hile arguably consistent on a doctrinal level, American First Amendment jurisprudence has fairly consistently resulted in suppression of extremist speech coming from the left and
in toleration of hate propaganda perpetrated by the extreme right.").
49. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Holmes & Brandeis, J.J., concurring); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at
672 (Holmes & Brandeis, J.J., dissenting); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624, 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
51. See id. at 301-02.
52. Id. at 308-09.
53. Id. at 310 (referring to the events in Nazi Germany).
54. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
55. Id. at 569.
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narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information
or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment
as a
56
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."
The New Hampshire statute met this test, as it did no more than prohibit
"face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by
the speaker-including 'classical fighting words,' words in current use
less 'classical' but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats."57
Chaplinsky remains the authority permitting the regulation of "fighting
words."
The Chaplinsky approach was affirmed by Beauharnais v. Illinois.58 Defendant, president of the "White Circle League," a racist organization, had warned against "'the white race ... becoming mongrel-

ized by the negro."' 59 He was fined $200 under a state statute outlawing
publications or exhibitions portraying "'depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion which said publication ...exposes the citizens of any race,

color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is
productive of breach of the peace or riots."6° The defendant challenged
the statute as violating his liberty of speech, a defense that was rejected
in an opinion delivered by Justice Frankfurter. Justice Frankfurter repeated the formula used in Chaplinsky, stating that there are "'welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu-

56. l at 571-72 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10) (footnotes omitted).
57. Id.at 573 (quoting State v. Brown, 38 A. 731 (N.H. 1895), and State v. McConnell, 47

A. 267 (N.H. 1900)).
58. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
59. IL at 252 (quoting the organization's leaflet).
60. AL at 251 (quoting the statute).
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tional problem."' 6' Libel constitutes one of these categories; thus the
question presented was whether the Constitution allows a state to punish
defamatory utterances directed not merely at an individual but "at a defined group.""z The Court decided to grant the state such power. The
opinion recounts many incidents of racial conflict: "From the murder of
the abolitionist Lovejoy in 1837 to the Cicero riots of 1951, Illinois has
been the scene of exacerbated tension between races, often flaring into
violence and destruction. 6 3 With regard to this history, the Court
"would deny experience to say that the Illinois legislature was without
reason in seeking ways to curb false or malicious defamation of racial
and religious groups." 64 Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, and Jackson dissented, but Justice Douglas drew a fine line:
Hitler and his Nazis showed how evil a conspiracy could be which
was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, derision,
and obloquy. I would be willing to concede that such conduct directed6
5
at a race or group in this country could be made an indictable offense.
How do these decisions differ from those of the earlier period? The
government is no longer allowed to limit freedom of expression for the
protection of any interest directly threatened by speech. However, certain categories of speech remain outside the constitutional guarantee,
including obscenity, fighting words, and libel. 6 At the same time, the
issue of racist speech is addressed by the Court when it takes into account not only the German, but also the quite different American experience. The conclusion is that racist speech can be outlawed as fighting
words and as group libel.
In the mid 1960s, the landmark opinion of Justice Brennan in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan67 led to a further change. Until this opinion,
the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment had found its limits in
the traditional rules of the law of defamation. After it, "the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"'
reversed the analysis for determining the power to regulate speech. The

61. lId at 255-56 (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309-10).
62. Id. at 258.
63. Id. at 259.
64. Id. at 261; see also id. at 261 n.16 (citing the classic article by David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 727 (1942)).
65. Id. at 284 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
66. This list is not intended to be exclusive.
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Id. at 270.
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essence of the tort of libel, as indicated previously,69 has certainly survived, but its application is now limited by the constitutional guarantee
of free expression.
0
Does this interfere with the group libel approach in Beauharnais?
7
Brandenburgv. Ohio confronted the Court with a similar fact situation.
Defendant organized a Ku Klux Klan meeting and planned to have it
filmed and broadcast. During the filmed meeting, "'revengeance"' was
threatened and, in a second film depicting the meeting, defendant added
that "'the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.' ' 72 He was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute,
enacted in 1919, for "'advocat[ing] ...the duty, necessity, or propriety
of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform.' 73 In a comparatively short per curiam opinion, this statute was declared unconstitutional as it abridged
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.7 4
The distinction of "mere advocacy" from "incitement to imminent lawless action 7 5 shows a similarity with the language in Chaplinsky76 indicating that the public peace can be protected only against speech which
is likely to produce immediate violence.
In 1977, the American Nazi Party planned a public march through
the village of Skokie, Illinois, a northern suburb of Chicago with a predominantly Jewish population, including several thousand survivors of
the Holocaust.7 Skokie responded by enacting three ordinances prohibiting demonstrations that would incite violence, hatred, abuse, or
hostility towards persons or groups by reference to race, nationality, or
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
Criminal
guage).

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See supranotes 58-66 and accompanying text.
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
IL at 447.
Id. at 444; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.01 (Anderson 1996) (replacing Ohio
Syndicalism Statute section 2923.13 cited in Brandenburg and omitting the quoted lan-

74. Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 449.
76. See supranotes 54-57 and accompanying text. Chaplinsky is not mentioned in Brandenburg, but the Court explicitly overruled Whitney v. California.See Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 449.
77. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir. 1978).
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religion." These ordinances were invalidated by the Seventh Circuit.79
The court distinguished Brandenburg and Chaplinsky and concluded
that Skokie did not justify the ordinances with "a fear of responsive
violence" or other threat to public peace. Beauharnaiscould not support the ordinances for the same reason.8 ' In addition, the Court found
that decisions like New York Times v. Sullivan "have abrogated the
Chaplinsky dictum, made one of the premises in Beauharnais,that the
punishment of libel 'has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem."'" For this reason, the court shares the doubt "that Beauharnais remains good law at all after the constitutional libel cases."' 3 The
result is supported by the observation that "[legislating against the
content of First Amendment activity, however, launches the government
on a slippery and precarious path."" In any case, it was and is no longer
certain that hate speech can be outlawed as group libel.
The final step in the American response to hate speech was
achieved by R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 5 A group of white teenagers
burned a cross within the fenced yard of a black family. 6 They were
charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, making it
a misdemeanor to place "'on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' The Minnesota Supreme Court construed and upheld the ordinance as banning only
"fighting words" within the meaning of Chaplinsky.8 This holding was
accepted as binding by the United States Supreme Court, with Justice
Scalia writing the opinion for a narrow majority.8 9 He stated that
Chaplinsky had to be corrected since obscenity, defamation, and fighting words could no longer be viewed as "categories of speech entirely

78. See id. at 1199-200.
79. See id. at 1210.
80. 111 at 1203.
81. See id.
at 1204-05.
82. Id. at 1205 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1202.
85. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
86. See id. at 379.
87. Id. at 380.
88. See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,510 (Minn. 1991).
89. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 378-79.
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invisible to the Constitution." 9 Rather, he concluded, they mark areas of
speech which can be regulated, but the government is not allowed to
impose additional content discrimination. 9' The Court emphasized that
this appeared to be particularly true for fighting words, observing that
their unprotected features are "essentially a 'non-speech' element of
communication. Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound
truck .... ,92 The Court resolved that the St. Paul ordinance was

"facially unconstitutional" as it applied only to fighting words that insult, or provoke violence, "'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.' 9 3 The Court clarified that the ordinance was not "mere content
regulation," but, in addition, "view-point discrimination."'94 In carrying

this idea further, the Court noted that "a State may not prohibit only that
commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion.""5 Finally, the Court concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional, and
could not be justified by the intent to protect a group that historically
had been the victim of discrimination.96 The concurring opinion by Justice White views the ordinance as "fatally overbroad because it crimi90. L at 383.
91. See id. at 384 ("1T]he government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.").
92. Id.at 386.
93. Id. at 391.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 389.
96. See id. at 394. This appears to be the only reference to the historical and social context
of cross-burning. As to this aspect, Judith Butler comments:
That the cross bums and thus constitutes an incendiary destruction is not considered as a sign of the intention to reproduce that incendiary destruction at the site of the
house or the family; the historical correlation between cross-burning and marking a
community, a family, or an individual for further violence is also ignored. How much
of that burning is translatable into a declarative or constative proposition? And how
would one know exactly what constative claim is being made by the burning cross? If
the cross is the expression of a viewpoint, is it a declaration as in, "I am of the opinion
that black people ought not to live in this neighborhood" or even, "I am of the opinion
that violence ought to be perpetrated against black people," or is it a perlocutionary
performative, as in imperatives and commands which take the form of "Bum!" or
"Die!"? Is it an injunction that works its power metonymically not only in the sense
that the fire recalls prior burnings which have served to mark black people as targets for
violence, but also in the sense that the fire is understood to be transferable from the
cross to the target that is marked by the cross? The relation between cross-burning and
torchings of both persons and properties is historically established. Hence, from this
perspective, the burning cross assumes the status of a direct address and a threatand, as
such, is construed either as the incipient moment of injurious action or as the statement
of an intention to injure.
JuDrrH BUTLER, ExcrrABLE SPEECH: A PoLmTcs OF THE PERFoRmAnrVE 57 (1997). For
similar observations, see Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence III., Epilogue: Burning
Crossesand the RA.V. Case, in WORDs THAT WOUND, supra note 43, at 133, 133-36.
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nalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the
First Amendment."'97 White sharply criticizes the majority opinion for
being inconsistent with precedent." This will not discussed in the context of this Article, as it is sufficient to state that as a result of the majority opinion, the "fighting word" category for not protected or lessprotected speech appears to be no longer available as a justification for
any ban imposed on any form of racist hate speech. The views of the
majority and the concurring opinion taken together provide little guidance for potential legislatures or regulators, ensuring that any ordinance
will probably be either too narrow or too broad or both at the same time.
Ill.

RACIST HATE SPEECH AS AN

A.

ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Explaining the Divergence?

The comparison of the American and the German reaction to hate
speech shows widely diverging perceptions and attitudes. The German
lawmakers are inspired by a continuing, if not increasing, concern as to
how the new or renewed use of language attacking, degrading, and dehumanizing stereotyped or artificially constructed groups may harm not
only the victims, but equally the social and cultural web of a civilized
community. This concern is so dominant that it has not allowed for a
more than very superficial examination as to if and to what extent the
expanding rules are compatible with freedom of speech. In the United
States, on the other hand, the legislative powers to contain racist speech
have been gradually narrowed down by the Supreme Court, and it may
well be that none of these powers have survived after R.A. V.v. St.
Paul." At the same time, the Court's perspective and rhetoric follow a
comparable closing trend. In Beauharnais,the Justices, speaking for the
majority as well as for the dissent, did not leave any doubt that they
were fully aware of the atrocities of the Holocaust, as well as of the
manifestations of racial violence in their own country. In R.A.V., the
Court found that "burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible,"" but the victims could be protected by the prohibition of arson
and criminal damage to property.' 1 Explaining the contrast between the
two systems by referring to history looks easy, but it does not appear
97. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at397.

98.
99.
100.
101.

See id. at 399-407.
See supra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
See id. at 380 n.1.
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very satisfactory. The German experience mandates comprehensive
rules against government interference with free speech rights and the
Federal Constitutional Court in general tends to pay full tribute to this
need.I° At the same time, there can be doubts that the American experience would allow one to deny the existence of any factual connections
between racist hate speech and acts of brutal violence and enduring
suppression.
B. InternationalAgreements
The divergence of the American and the German reactions to hate

speech is still more remarkable for a normative reason. There is a broad
international consensus that freedom of expression is a fundamental
human right which has to be defended against the suppression by governments. This is reflected in, among others, Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights;' 3 Article 19 of the International Cove0 the American Convennant on Civil and Political Rights ("CCPR");"'
0
5
tion on Human Rights; Article 10 of the ECHR; 1 6 and the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe.' But these guarantees are not
thought to be absolute; they are limited by an equally broad international consensus that they do not include the most degrading and threatening forms of racist speech. This is documented by Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD").' Article 4 says:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which
are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of
102. See CURREE, supra note 8, at 174-81; Eberle, supra note 8, at 800-04.
103. Adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 217A(1I) of Dec. 10,
1948. For the text, see STRIKING ABALANCE, supra note 1, at 378.
104. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly
Resolution 2200A(XXI) of Dec. 16, 1966; entered into force March 23, 1976, For the text, see
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 381.
105. Adopted by the Organization of American States on Nov. 22, 1969; entered into force on
July 18, 1978. For the text, see STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 382-83.
106. Signed by the Contracting States of the Council of Europe on Nov. 4, 1950; entered into
force on Sept. 3, 1953. For the text, see STRIKING ABALANCE, supra note 1, at 384.
107. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,
June 5-29, 1990. For the text, see STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 388-90.
108. Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly
resolution 2106A(XX) of Dec. 21, 1965; entered into force on Jan. 4, 1969. For the text, see
STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 379-80. The history and the problems of interpretation of
Article 4 are explained by Karl Josef Partsch, Racial Speech and Human Rights: Article 4 of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, in STRIKING A BALANCE,
supra note 1, at 21, 21-28.
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persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitements to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of such persons of another colour or ethnic
origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.""'
This principle is confirmed by Article 20, paragraph 2 CCPR: "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement
to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."' 0
It is obvious that Article 4 CERD as well as Article 20 paragraph 2
CCPR conflict with free speech guarantees in international conventions
and national constitutions"' It is not surprising that the United States,
upon ratification of the CERD and of the CCPR, has attached reservations to both of them. Neither Article 4 CERD nor Article 20 paragraph
2 CCPR could "authorize or require legislation.., by the United States
that would restrict the right of free speech ... protected by the Constitution and the laws of the United States."" 2 It has been doubted that
these reservations are indispensable." 3 This is not to be discussed here;
for the following proposals, it is assumed that, at the very least, R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul prevents the United States government from an unre109. STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 1, at 379-80.
110. Id. at 381. For the history of Article 20, paragraph 2 CCPR and its relationship to Article
4 CERD, see MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PoLmcAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COmMENTARY 365-69 (1993).
111. This had been intensively discussed in the drafting process. See NowAK, supra note 110,
at 367-68; Partsch, supranote 108, at 26-27.
112. NOWAK, supranote 110, at 770.
113. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 343 (1995); Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA,
14 CONST. CoiMENTARY 33, 42 n.54, 42-43 (1997).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 27:335

stricted ratification of Article 4 CERD and Article 20 paragraph 2
CCPR. We are then faced with the question of if and to what extent the
interpretation given to national constitutions by national adjudication
could and should be inspired and guided by the evolving principles of
international law, in particular by the normative patterns of agreements
providing for the protection of human rights."4
C. The Reasons Behind the InternationalAgreements
The increasingly complex relationship between constitutional adjudication and international law cannot be generally discussed within
the narrow scope of this Article. The investigation here has to be limited
to the much closer question of whether the purpose behind the international rules protecting free speech and requiring prohibitions of expressions of racist hatred might advocate a more harmonious approach to
resolving such a conflict. Such an approach we have seen in the landmark decisions reshaping, but not eliminating, the tort and criminal law
rules against defamation by reconciling them with the requirements imposed by free speech guarantees." 5 Therefore, it has to be asked: What
are the purposes served by provisions like Article 4 CERD and Article
20 paragraph 2 CCPR, which advocate a common commitment of all
civilized nations to join efforts in order to contain the most threatening
and reprehensible manifestations of racial hatred? Several such reasons
can be identified.
First, court decisions like R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul give the impression of racist hate speech as the spontaneous and emotional behavior of people who are socially marginalized by their lack of education,
employment, income, status, and recognition. This observation is likely
to obscure another important aspect. The bias and the prejudices triggering specific incidents are mostly generated by organized propaganda
and/or by commercially produced and distributed materials. For a rather
long time, the business of printing and disseminating anti-Semitic and
similarly repulsive publications has been international. In 1965, the Canadian Cohen Committee based its recommendation to introduce legislation against racist speech on the "recent upsurge in hate propaganda"
and concluded: "Most worrisome of all is that in recent years Canada
has become a major source of supply of hate propaganda that finds its
114. For another example of such a confrontation of national traditions with evolving supranational principles, see J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the
German MaastrichtDecision, 1 EUR. L.J 219 (1995).
115. See supra PartLC.
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'' 6
way to Europe and specially to West Germany."
Twenty years later, Professor Eric Stein reviewed the then available sources addressing the proliferation of anti-Semitic material and
found they suggested that "the center for the collection and distribution
of all this literature is located in California."" 7 As it has become obviously impossible to stop the inflow of highly threatening and therefore
illegal material through inspections and checks performed by customs
services or similar authorities, any defensive measure taken by the receiving country would need the cooperation of the country where the
material is produced and shipped."' This cooperation can be effectively
ensured only by the mechanism of mutual assistance in criminal proceedings. However, the agreements providing for mutual assistance
generally require that the acts under investigation can be criminally
punished under both legal systems."9 Thus, a country which views itself
as socially peaceful and politically stable and therefore abstains from
prohibiting any form of hate speech, can still contribute to the incitement of racial violence in a more exposed country by allowing the production and exportation of racist materials. 2 1 International conventions
requiring sovereign states to outlaw hate speech serve the purpose of
eliminating such a threat. Mutual assistance might be particularly
needed for the fight against the least justifiable form of racist hate
speech-the carefully planned exploitation of racial bias and prejudice
in order to maximize profits or power.
A second reason justifying a common commitment to the prohibition of hate speech is that the consequences of racial obsessions and
ethnic conflicts will rarely be confined to the territory of one country.
The Holocaust was certainly planned and initiated by Nazi Germany,

116. See SPECIAL COMMIrEE, supranote 5, at 69.
117. Stein, supranote 2, at 280.
118. In a comparable manner, the fight against the abuse of drugs in the countries of consumption depends on the cooperation by the countries where the drugs originate.
119. This is illustrated by the case of Otto Ernst Remer. As an officer in the German army, he
had been instrumental in helping Hitler retain control of Germany after the failed assassination
attempt in July 1944. After promotion, he had become responsible for Hitler's personal security. In
the 1950's he began to engage in neo-Nazi activities. In 1994, he fled to Spain in order to escape a
22-month jail term in Germany for publicly denouncing the Holocaust as a deliberate lie. He could
not be extradited by Spain, as hate speech there was not penalized until a law prohibiting it was
enacted in 1995. See Otto Remer, 84, Nazi Officer; Helped FoilAnti-Hitler Plot,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 1997, at D22.
120. This observation contradicts the popular assumption that legislation should respond exclusively to the local situation. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 199 (positing that antiSemitism is not enough of a problem in the United States to require an explicit congressional ban
on Nazi speech).
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but it evolved into an operation involving victims and cooperators from
many other countries. The fight between Turks and Curds generates
violent crimes throughout Europe, and the atrocities committed in the
provinces of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia, affect many
of the neighboring countries. These countries have to host refugees, they
are called upon to contribute to peace keeping measures, and they may
be exposed to economic externalities by losing markets and other opportunities. The international approach reflects the experience that the consequences of racially motivated violence can rarely be confined to national borderlines.
The case of Bosnia is significant for still another reason. It is often
assumed that the events of the 1990s-killings, torture, rape, concentration camps, "ethnic cleansing""'-have to be understood as the mere
continuation of old ethnic strife which had been merely interrupted and
temporarily suppressed by the Communist regime. This view is not
confirmed by the reported evidence. Slobodan Milosevic intentionally
used Serbian nationalism as an instrument to stabilize and expand his
power. He made use of mass media, in particular television, to incite
Serbian resentments against Croates and Muslims.'2 The hatred motivating the atrocities has been the result of propagandistic engineering." 3
Warren Zimmermann, the then American ambassador to Bosnia, recalls
that the "virus of television spread ethnic hatred like an epidemic."'2 4
This observation raises important questions for the Yugoslavia War
Crimes Tribunal. Should the prosecution be limited to those in immediate command and to their eager executioners, to the Karadzic, Mladic,
2 as well as to the Himmler or Eichmann, or should a figure
and Tadic"'
like Joseph Goebbels, who organized and directed the anti-Semitic
propaganda machinery of the Nazi regime, not be equally held responsible for the consequences of his activity? This aspect again recommends a broad international understanding that a limited area of "hard
core" racist propaganda cannot be justified as the exercise of free
speech rights and, therefore, should not be automatically excluded from
121. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 29-30 (1997).

122. See id. at 25.
123. See Anthony Lewis, War Crimes, in THE BLACK BOOK OF BOSNIA 58 (Nader Mousavizadeh ed., 1996).
124. WARREN ZIMERMAN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS DESTROYERS-AMERICA'S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY 121 (1996).
125. See SCHARF, supra note 121, at 93-96. Tadic reportedly singled out the intellectuals,

leaders, and other prominent Muslims for immediate execution in the town of Kozarac. See id. at
95.
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the proceedings of war crime tribunals, be it in Nuremberg or in The
Hague.
The European experience suggests a final observation. In R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, the majority opinion framed the issue as one of protecting minorities "who express views on disfavored subjects" against the
majority's "special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled
out."'26 Even if this reflects an accurate understanding of the issue
within the sophisticated web of the political process in a country like the

United States, it is much less than an adequate description of what has
happened and happens in other places. The construction of racial differences between people, and the propagandistic degradation and dehumanization of groups thus singled out and separated, is used as an efficient instrument to maximize power. In this game, the limits between
"private" and "state" action become blurred and the rivaling factions
grasp and usurp functions of government in order to enhance and stabilize their influence.2 7 The closer they get to public office, the more they
become interested in gaining and retaining a certain amount of respectability in order to gain the support they need domestically and from
abroad."r Rules outlawing the language which denies individuals and
groups the dignity of human beings can help to interfere with such a
strategy; respectability will less easily be reconciled with permanent illegal action. 29 Therefore, laws against racist speech can have symbolic
126. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391,396 (1992).
127. This has been earlier observed for the Nazi regime, but it appears equally, if not even
more true, for the feuds between war lords in regions like Bosnia or Central Africa. See generally
ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP (1941)
(explaining how Hitler and the Nazi Party gained power for themselves by usurping the functions
of government).
128. See Fox & Nolte, supra note 15, at 10-13. This can be illustrated by the German situation in the early 1930s. The SA continued to shout their racist slurs in the streets; at the same time
Hitler and Ghring were assuring the German conservatives that this was merely to be taken as the
awkward expression of dissatisfaction with the political status quo.
129. There is a proposition that the anti-hate laws of pre-Hitler Germany were generally ineffective. See, e.g., A. ALAN BoRovoY, WHEN FREEDOMS COLLIDE: THE CASE FOR OUR CIVIL
LIBERTIES 50 (1988). This proposition is unfounded-the Weimar Republic had no such laws. For
the consequences of this gap, see Ambrose Doskow & Sidney B. Jacoby, Anti-Semitism and the
Law in Pre-Nazi Germany, CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECoRD 498-509 (1940) (detailing that court
enforcement of existing rules was ineffective, but "[u]ndoubtedly, the statutes could have been
greatly strengthened"); Donald L. Niewyk, Jews and the Courts in Weimar Germany, 37 JEWISH
Soc. STUD. 99 (1975); David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Controlof Group Libel, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 727 (1942) (showing how the lack of group libel protection was successfully used
by the Nazis and other extreme right wing groups to undermine the democratic government by the
systematic distribution of lies). Niewyk's carefully researched and well documented article concludes: "[Those] matters other than judicial bias were the major obstacles to justice in cases
touching upon the legal defense of Jews." Niewyk, supra, at 112. In addition, the prosecution of
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importance; they show effects even before or without being enforced by
courts. This impact will be strengthened if the law is supported by international agreements mandating such rules.
IV. LOOKING FOR A COMMON GROUND
As there appears to exist a need for, or at least a strong interest in,
a more harmonized approach to racist speech, it would be useful to examine a few topics in order to map out a conceptual framework and to
identify what could be the starting point for a basic agreement. For this
reason, the following observations should not be read as the doctrinal
analysis of any specific legal system; they are intended to suggest a
blueprint of reference for a discussion that might contribute to the approximation of widely differing perspectives.
A.

Free Speech Concerns

The investigation has to start by emphasizing freedom of expression. International conventions and national constitutions protect individual liberty. Their "key ethical postulate is that respect for individual
integrity and autonomy requires the recognition that a person has the
right to use speech to develop herself or to influence or interact with
others in a manner that corresponds to her values."'30 This freedom, at
the same time, is an indispensable element of democracy. It safeguards
the "structure of public discourse, so that our democracy will be able to
serve the end of collective self-determination..'.' The "free speech
principle requires us to begin with a strong presumption in favor of toleration."' 2 This includes the toleration of unpopular and even distasteful
beliefs as well as of the use of repulsive and shocking language. Some
more specific aspects have to be mentioned at least briefly.
Public discourse is often the most effective and, in any case, the
most desirable method to deal with racist bias and prejudice. Therefore,
contributions to this discourse have to be kept free from sanctions. It has
been doubted that drawing such a line will be possible: the adoption of
censorship would also silence "the subversive, activist use of hate
speech."' 3' But the courts, at least those reviewing the constitutionality
Judeophobes was impeded by a lack of laws prohibiting defamation on racial grounds and allowing class actions. See id.
130. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 59 (1989).
131. Post, supra note 43, at 126.
132. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 197.
133. Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography,and the Problemfor Artistic Ex-
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of sanctions, have generally been able to distinguish the merely aggressive and inciting from the argumentative use. Thus parody, caricature,
and satire remain free even if these products are liable to shock, disgust,
and hurt.TM The same has proven true for news reporting. As long as the
media does not adopt and endorse the message advocating racist violence, they retain full discretion as to the manner of presenting the evidence of racist prejudice and hate-inspired activities to their audiences. 13
At the same time, it has to be remembered that, in a democratic
system, free speech is primarily a right protecting minorities against
suppression of their views and their communicative desires by the majority. The exercise of unabridged free speech rights can be an effective
defense against discrimination and degradation. There will always be
the risk that laws punishing hate speech are applied against members of
minority groups. 36 However, as modem societies become more diversified, majorities tend to be replaced by an increasing number of minorities. The mere fact that the British legislation against hate speech has
led to the conviction of black spokesmen 37 does not support the conclusion that such laws are generally counterproductive. The protection of
suppressed minorities is certainly a concern which can and in many
cases should encourage statutory bans on racist speech; but such prohibitions should not and cannot be imposed exclusively upon those who
speak for a majority.
B. Consistency Problems of Speech Regulation
The crucial importance of free speech rights for any open and
democratic society is indisputable, but why should the freedom to
communicate be fully incompatible with any regulation outlawing any
form of racial hate speech? The majority opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul appears to come close to such an absolute position. 38 If each ban
on racial hate speech is content regulation or even viewpoint discrimipression,84 CAL. L. REv. 1499, 1572 (1996).
134. See 82 BVerfGE 1 (5) ("Hitler-T-Shirt"); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988) (adjudicating a libel case involving emotional harm).
135. This has been most clearly expressed by the EHRC in the Jersild case. 298 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 32-35 (1994), available at <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudocViewHtml.a...e
-0&Noticemode= &RelatedMode=0&X= 116194655>.
136. See Nadine Strossen, Balancing the Rights to Freedom of Expression and Equality: A
Civil Liberties Approach to Hate Speech on Campus, in STRIUNG A BALANCE, supra note 1, at
295, 307-09 (arguing that the banning of racist speech could aggravate racism).
137. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 163 (1985).
138. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,391-96 (1992).
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nation, there remains hardly any room for legislative action. Such a far-

reaching 3doctrine
raises serious issues of consistency in the underlying
9

policies.1

There is no legal system which does not provide for some regulation of communicative content. At least some forms of obscenity are
generally thought to be expression of very little or of no value and

therefore outside the constitutional protection of free speech. 4 The reasons for this exclusion are not always well explained, 4' and they have

changed over time. Two arguments have emerged as more persuasive
than the traditional reference to morals. One is the fear that the distribution and use of pornographic material is related to violence and crime.4

The other is that obscenity systematically degrades human beings, depicting them as mere objects. 143 Both arguments are directly applicable
to racist speech.'" The basic purpose of racist speech is to degrade others, to deny them their identity as human beings, to exclude them from

the entitlements of the basic social and constitutional covenant, and to
expose them to violence, "ethnic cleansing," and extermination. At least

in its crudest forms, racist hate speech has a normative meaning which
transcends the expression of a mere "viewpoint." By denying human
dignity to some people, it attacks the very basis of a democratic system.
Similar problems arise with regard to defamation. For good rea-

139. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine the consistency of the majority opinion in
RA.V. with precedent. Compare Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (finding that petitioner's
threats against the President, although violative of a specific statute, were only "'a very crude, offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President'), with Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476, 487-90 (1993) (validating the application of a statute enhancing punishment for racial animus despite petitioner's First Amendment argument); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 194-95 (1993) (highlighting the Supreme
Court's failure to adequately explain the inconsistencies between its decisions in R.A.V. and
Mitchell).
140. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (refusing to confer First
Amendment protections on child pornography); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973)
(stating that "prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection").
141. See GREENAWALT, supra note 43, at 103 (stating that-"the Supreme Court has never explained fully why obscenity falls completely outside of First Amendment protection").
142. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (explaining that
the zoning ordinance applicable to adult theaters was designed to prevent crime); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976) (explaining that the focus of a zoning ordinance was the correlation between "adult" movie theaters and crime); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (citing a report correlating obscene material and crime).
143. This aspect is more obvious in the Canadian adjudication. See Regina v. Butler [1992]
89 D.L.R. 449, 489-90 (upholding a criminal obscenity law as a justified limitation on the guarantee of freedom of expression to prevent degrading or dehumanizing women).
144. See Cohen, supranote 43, at 258-60.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol27/iss2/3

30

Kübler: How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a C
1998]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RACIST SPEECH

sons, constitutional adjudication has considerably cut back the traditional rules protecting individual reputation in order to allow uninhibited and robust debate on all matters of legitimate public interest. 45
However, no public official or public figure, as important as she may
be, has to tolerate a defamatory falsehood, if she can prove that the
statement was made with actual malice, "that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'' 46 It
is hard to see a First Amendment argument which could compel us to
categorically deny groups of persons at least some of the protection reserved for public officials and public figures. If it is true that "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact,"' 47 rules protecting
minorities against the dissemination of deliberate falsehoods cannot be
judged to be unconstitutional.
Again following venerable legal traditions, it is generally accepted
that speech can be regulated in order to preserve "public peace." This
has been the starting point for specific rules against racist hate speech in
Germany. 4 1 In the United States, the common law wrong of "sedition"
has survived as a First Amendment exception for "the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 49 The borderlines of
this exception again raise questions. It is the spontaneous speech, very
often the emotional reaction to a conflict situation, which is deprived of
protection; thus the well planned and organized infliction of emotional
distress or similar harm is privileged. This can hardly be justified by the
assumption that the direct attack does not allow a response whereas calculated propaganda can be countered by speech. It has been correctly
observed that particularly appalling forms of degrading racial insults
will silence their targets.'50 In addition, the fighting words doctrine applies to events where the verbal provocation will be answered by physical force. This approach is "deeply troubling," the same language might
"be punishable if directed at the one person able to physically retaliate
and be constitutionally protected if directed at people not able to match
the speaker physically."'.'

145. See supra PartI.C.
146. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280 (1964).
147. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
148. See supra Part lI.A.
149. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,
JR., FREE SPEECH INTHE UNITED STATES 149 (1941)).
150. See FlSS, supranote 48, at 119; SuNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 186.
151. GREENAWALT, supranote 43, at 52.
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C. Reasons to Regulate Hate Speech
A more consistent approach will require the more precise identification of the potential and real harms inflicted by racist speech. This issue has been carefully examined before; 2 thus, a short summary should
suffice.
First, racist speech advocates discrimination, and it denies the right
to equal protection and treatment, which itself is constitutionally ensured by bills of rights, constitutional amendments, and international
conventions.'53 But here, the conflict with liberty is most obvious; selfdetermination includes the right to make choices and to base them on
individual predilections. Freedom of expression comprises the freedom
to contribute to the social definition of others,'m yet this freedom may
find its legitimate limits where people (e. g., by equating them with
animals like rats or with vermin) 5 are denied the dignity which is the
basis of all human rights and to which all human beings are equally entitled.
A second result of hate speech is the emotional pain and distress,
the intimidation and fear, which racist speech is able to inflict upon
members of the targeted group. These harms include "feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred."'56 It could be argued that suffering
these effects is part of the price to be paid by everybody for the huge
advantages provided by a system which is based on the principles of
free individual expression and open discourse of public affairs. But
there are good reasons for a more subtle and differentiating approach.
The painful and intimidating effect of racial insults tends to increase
with repetition, and it often will be particularly strong for those who
have previously been the victims of racially motivated persecution and
violence. Under the specific circumstances of Germany, the regard for
the survivors of the Holocaust should be sufficient reason to allow the
prohibition of maliciously denying the Holocaust. Such a justification
carries more weight than the argument generally used by the German
152. See MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 43, at 2326-31; Lawrence, supra note 43, at 458-66;
Post, supra note 43, at 118-22 (addressing the harms of racist speech, but not mentioning violence).
153. For a discussion of the impact of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments on the
regulation of racist speech, see Amar, supra note 43, at 153-60.
154. See Karst,supra note 43, at 95.
155. These had been the facts in a case adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights.
See Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1994), availableat <http:lwww.dhcour.coe.frlhudoc/
ViewHtml.=a...e=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O&X= 116194655>.
156. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982).
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courts, that untrue statements of fact are barred from free speech protection if the falsity is either known to the speaker or has been established by proof.. 7
A third reason for the imposition of limits upon racist speech is
that this form of public stigmatization may silence a minority and exclude its members individually as well as a group from communicative
interaction and from integration into the fabric of a civilized society.
This "silencing effect" has met with the most academic literary attention. 5 ' It is obviously difficult to answer racial insults with civilized
speech, as they function as a "preemptive strike."'59 Intimidation may
amount to coercion and thus result in much more than discrimination.
We are confronted "not simply with a conflict between liberty and
equality, but also with a conflict within liberty."''0 And the injury is not
limited to individuals who no longer dare to speak out; it also affects the
public good of the marketplace of ideas. The exclusion of potential
speakers undermines the utility and the legitimacy of public discourse
as a key element of democratic systems.' The importance of this aspect
is reflected in existing case law. For the United States, it has been persuasively observed that Brown v. Board of Education 62 is a case dealing
with racist speech. 6 1 The German Federal Constitutional Court has
barred a television network from showing at prime time a docudrama
identifying by likeness and name a convicted criminal shortly before
release on probation. Having served his term, he was entitled to a fair
chance of rehabilitation and the opportunity to become a respected
member of his local community 64 The Court provided protection
157. See 90 BVerfGE 241 (247-48) ("Auschwitz Lie"). In reality, the German constitutional
court is not strictly applying such a doctrine. Denying the facts which emphasize German responsibility for the Second World War has been held to be constitutionally protected speech. See 90
BVerfGE 1 (13-14,20-22) ("Jugendgefiibrdende Schriften").
158. See FtSS, supra note 48, at 116 (arguing that certain speech activities-for example
cross-buming--"have to be curbed in order to protect the expressive activities of blacks in the
community"); SuNSTEIN, supranote 139, at 186; Adler, supra note 133, at 1505; Karst, supra note
43, at 109-16; Lawrence, supra note 43, at 466-72; Frank Michelman, Universities,Racist Speech
and Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 351-52
(1992); Post, supra note 43, at 120.
159. See Lawrence, supra note 43, at 452.
160. Fiss, supra note 48, at 120.
161. See Lawrence, supranote 43, at 468-72; Post, supranote 43, at 120.
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163. See Lawrence, supra note 43, at 463 ("Brown is a case about group defamation. The
message of segregation was stigmatizing to black children. To be labeled unfit to attend school
with white children injured the reputation of black children, thereby foreclosing employment opportunities and the right to be regarded as respected members of the body politic.").
164. 35 BVerfGE 202 ("Lebach"), available at <http:lwww.uni-wuerzburg.delglaw/
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against highly organized and influential media speech in order to safeguard individual chances for communicative participation.
The most pressing need to curb expressions of racial hatred arises
from their link to physical violence. It is generally agreed that a narrow
set of expressions is exempt from free speech protection: inciting another person to commit a specific crime can be punished as abetting and
instigating, and insults provoking immediate violent reactions can be
outlawed under the fighting words doctrine. 65 These cases have in
common a direct and unambiguous causal connection between a specific expression and a specific violent act. The events involving larger
groups, however, are different: the Holocaust, or the killings and mutilations inflicted by lynch mobs,' or the use of torture in South Africa, 67
or "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia cannot be traced to one particular public
statement, but this cannot mean that they are unrelated to speech. In
each of these examples, as different as they are, we find the condicio
sine qua non of a "culture" or "climate"'6--a specific pattern of popular
assumptions and beliefs stigmatizing specific groups as inferior and
harmful. Such a culture cannot emerge and expand without communication, and it is, to a considerable extent, the product of organized
69 Its impact again appears to be complex; only a few may
propaganda.'
be encouraged to torture and to kill, but many others will become inclined to tolerate what should be unacceptable. Legal rules outlawing
extreme forms of racist speech will not suffice to eliminate such a
"climate," but they can help to contain it by destroying its legitimacy
and by depriving its proponents of their respectability.
D. Different Speakers
The elaboration of a "common ground" may finally be advanced
by the observation of how the regulation of racist speech can be differentiated as to speakers. Free speech doctrine increasingly distinguishes
two justifications for constitutional protection. As a human right, free
expression is an indispensable element of individual liberty. Each limi-

bv035202.html>. The court explicitly stated that this restriction applied only to a major public
service television channel and certainly not to any form of a more private communication.
165. See supraPart I.B.
166. See Karst, supra note 43, at 112.
167. See Suzanne Daley, Apartheid Torturer Testifies, As Evil Shows Its Banal Face, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1997, at Al (describing the practices inspired by the ideology of apartheid, which
are now revealed by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
168. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 15-16.
169. See supraPart fI. C.
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tation conflicts with the speaker's fundamental right to expressive selfdetermination and self-realization, 70 and can therefore be justified only

for reasons carrying as much weight as the basic human right. At the
same time, speech is protected for functional reasons: "A system of free
expression ...has value because it enables the public ... to arrive at
truth and make wise decisions, especially about matters of public import."'' This distinction explains why we tend to give some protection
to forms of expression-like corporate or commercial speech-that
cannot be viewed as serving the primary purpose of human selfexpression.12 Their protection is justified and required by the social
purpose they serve; therefore regulation enhancing this purpose has to
be allowed.
This distinction is reflected in the ways hate speech is regulated.
There appears to exist a broad consensus that conversations of a purely
private nature-within the family or a small group of friends-should
be kept free from any sanctions.'73 This exclusion respects a core area of
individual liberty. The exchange of views with those who are next to the
speaker should be kept free from legal intervention, regardless of how
offensive and harmful these views may appear to others. At the same
time, German law has subjected broadcasting to much stricter rules than
any other form of communication.'74 Such a distinction is not unknown
to American law. As "the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans"'75 and as "broadcasting

170. See BAKER, supra note 130, at 47-69; Friedrich Kuibler, Massenkommunikation und
Medienverfassung, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR LERCHE 649 (1993). Elena Kagan views this as a
"speaker-based" model of First Amendment doctrine. See Kagan, supranote 43, at 424.
171. Kagan, supra note 43, at 424 (calling this second approach the "audience-based" model);
see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 53-77 (explaining that one of the most important issues in
contemporary democracies is the regulation of broadcasting); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARv. L. REV. 781, 787-94 (1987) (outlining how the market constrains the presentation of matters of public interest and importance).
172. See C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 2 Sup.CT. REV.57, 62-80 (1994).
173. The new version of Article 130 of the German Penal Code sanctions speech "liable to
disturb the public peace" or distribution by mass media or statements made "in public or in an assembly." See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text. In a very similar way, section 18, paragraph 2 of the British Public Order Act 1986 explicitly provides "that no offence is committed
where the words or behavior are used, or the written material is displayed, by a person inside a
dwelling, and are not heard or seen except by the persons in that or another dwelling." For this
legislation, see Public Order Act 1936 § 18, para. 2; BARENDT, supra note 137, at 163-64. In very
much the same way, French law only sanctions messages made to the public. See GumE DES Lois
ANTmicisms 8-9 (Minist~re de la Justice, 1994) (text on file with Author).
174. See supra Part U.A.
175. Federal Communication Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748 (1978).
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is uniquely accessible to children,', 6 indecent speech, which would be
protected for all other speakers, can be banned from the programs of
radio and television. Constitutional protection could, therefore, be reduced for the exclusively commercial production and distribution of
hate speech material.
V.

THE "COMMON GROUND" BETWEEN "SLIPPERY SLOPES" AND
"MARGINS OF APPRECIATION"

A.

The "Slippery Slope" Argument

The rough sketch of the framework conditions suggests that there
are many starting points for the elaboration of a "common ground." The
respect for the fundamental needs addressed by international agreements i" can be reconciled in many ways with the normative propositions of constitutional systems emphasizing the importance of collective
self-determination by public discourse. But there remains another argument opposing a more balanced approach to racist hate speech"simply the inability to draw any line that would effectively exclude this
kind of speech while not intruding on speech that everyone believed
valuable and worthy of protection." ' It appears that racist speech lends
itself more than other issues to this reasoning:
The Skokie controversy provides one of the most notorious modem
examples of this type of argument in freedom of speech debates. The
argument there was not that freedom of speech in theory ought to protect the Nazis, but rather that denying free speech protection to Nazis
was likely to start us down a slippery slope, at the bottom of which
would be the 79denial of protection even to those who should, in theory,
be protected.
Why is this concern not shared by other legal systems? Is it the
sheer size of the United States, its internal diversity, and, in addition, its
tradition to adjudicate by jury, which requires that the lines be drawn by
a very broad brush? Other systems face similar difficulties; this is most
obvious in examining the judicial enforcement of the European Human

176.

L at 749.

177. See supra Part M.B.
178. BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 34.

179. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HAV. L. REV. 361, 363 (1985) (footnotes omitted) (referring to Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)); see supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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Rights Convention. 80 Even in the United States, the rhetoric of the
"slippery slope" (or the "foot in the door" or "camel's nose in the
tent") s' appears to be losing its magic: "[T]he line-drawing claim is one
of the most beguiling methods of obfuscation and diversion in legal argumentation,' " "totalizing" is an extreme form of-mostly disguisedprivileging;" 3 slippery slope arguments represent "an exaggerated form
of distrust""' and could "in virtually every case" be equally made for
the opposite proposition."' This rejection of the slippery slope argument
is particularly persuasive where we are faced with conflicts of human
rights. In these cases, the task of constitutional adjudication should be to
draw the finer lines which will take into account the legitimate concerns
of both sides.
B. The Emergence of a "Common Ground" in
ConstitutionalAdjudication
It may be useful to recall very briefly that there are constitutional
courts that have engaged in the task of reconciling freedom of expression with internationally mandated restrictions for racist hate speech.
Article 269 of the Hungarian Penal Code punishes not only the
incitement of hatred against nations, people, creed, or race in paragraph
1, but, in paragraph 2, the use of offensive or denigrating expressions
against these groups. 1 6 In a case where the publisher of an extremist
right wing newspaper had engaged in anti-Semitic propaganda and
therefore been accused under Article 269," 7 the Hungarian Constitutional Court annulled paragraph 2 but upheld paragraph 1 of this provision."' The decision explains that freedom of expression protects every
idea, "irrespective of the value or veracity of its content"; every individual opinion, "good or bad, pleasant or offensive," has a place in the
social process of communication. But the state may resort to restriction,

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See infra Part V.B.
Schauer, supranote 179, at 361.
BOLLINGER, supra note 43, at 37.
See Powell, supra note 43, at 23.
Cohen, supra note 143, at 257.
See Schauer, supra note 179, at 381.
See Biintet6 T6rv6nyk6nyv art. 269 (Penal Code).

187. See GABOR HALMAI, DIE MEINUNGSFREIHEIT IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES UNGARISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTS, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR STERN 953, 957 (1997) (relating the

facts of the case); Gabor Halmai, CriminalLaw as Means Against Racist Speech? The Hungarian
Legal Approach, 4 J. CONsT. L. E. & CENT. EuR. 41, 45-46 (1997) (providing a critical comment
on the case).
188. See Decision (V.26.) AB from Dec. 30, 1992 (English translation on file with Author).
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where this is indispensable for the protection of another fundamental
right, in particular for the protection of human dignity which is
"everyone's birthright."' s9 Therefore, the incitement of hatred against
groups defined in racial, ethnic, national, or religious terms can be outlawed: "The tragic historical experiences of our country prove that
views preaching racial, ethnic, national or religious inferiority or superiority, the dissemination of ideas of hatred, contempt and exclusion endanger the values of human civilization. ' 0
In two opinions, both enormously well researched and carefully argued, and both accompanied by an equally impressive dissent, the Canadian Supreme Court engaged in the drawing of similar lines. 9' Section 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code outlaws the communication
of statements, other than in private conversation, that willfully promote
hatred against any identifiable group.' Keegstra, the defendant high
school teacher, was convicted for describing Jews to his pupils as
"treacherous," "sadistic," "money-loving," "child-killers."'9 " His conviction was affirmed. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
protects freedom of expression (section 2(b)), as well as equality
(section 15(1)) and "the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians" (section 27). The Court referred to all of
these provisions as well as to Article 4 CERD and Article 20 paragraph
2 CCPR, and found that the ban on hate speech satisfies a pressing and
substantial concern in a free and democratic society. 9 In the end, the
Court saw a conflict between speech rights and concluded "that it is
through rejecting hate propaganda that the state can best encourage the
protection of values central to freedom of expression.' 96 But only two
years later, the limits imposed upon the regulation of racist speech under section 2(b) of the charter became obvious in another criminal case
appealed to the Supreme Court.'9 7 Defendant Zundel had published a
booklet, which had previously been printed and distributed in the United
States, describing the Holocaust as a myth perpetrated by a worldwide
Jewish conspiracy."' The conviction was based on section 181 of the
189. Id. at5.

190. Id. at4.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

For an excellent summary of these cases, see GREENAWALT, supra note 43, at 64-70.
See Canadian Criminal Code § 319(2).
See Regina v. Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 713-14.
See supraPart II.
See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 745-49.
Id. at 764.
See Regina v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731.
See id. at 779-80.
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criminal code, which prohibited the willful publication of false statements likely to cause injury to a public interest.' 99 This time, the court
reversed for section 181's "fatal flaw-its overbreath."' The Court
held that
Section 181 can be used to inhibit statements which society considers
should be inhibited, like those which denigrate vulnerable groups. Its
danger, however, lies in the fact that, by its broad reach, it criminalizes
a vast penumbra of other statements merely because they might be
thought to constitute a mischief to some public interest .... 201
The Faurisson case,2°2 decided by the Human Rights Committee
enforcing the CCPR,s 3 shows how the international legal community
reacts to the denial of the Holocaust. Robert Faurisson, a historian of
French and British nationality, in a press interview called the gas chambers in the Nazi concentration camps a myth and dishonest fabrication
("c'est une gredinerie"). Associations of French resistance fighters and
of deportees to German concentration camps filed a private criminal action against Faurisson under the "Loi Grayssot," which makes it an offense to contest the existence of crimes against humanity which had
been established by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in
1945 and 1946. Faurisson was sentenced by French courts to pay a fine
and punitive damages. His appeal to the Human Rights Committee was
rejected. The Committee did not exclude the possibility that the application of the Loi Gayssot could interfere with the free speech guarantee
of article 19 CCPR. But in the case of Faurisson, the Committee saw no
reason to reverse the decisions of the French courts. Denying that the
Holocaust took place can be punished as a defamation; the government
is entitled to take action against this "principal vehicle for antisemitism." 2°4
A final example is provided by the review system established for
the enforcement of the European Human Rights Convention. The
Commission of Human Rights ("Commission") 2°5 has rejected two
199. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch.1, § 181 (1985) (Can.).
200. Zundel, 2 S.C.R. at 772.
201. Id. at771-72.
202. (Commun. No. 550/1993) (16 Dec. 1996) (58th Session), UN H.R. Comm., Doc. No.
CCPRCI581DI55011993 (on file with Author).
203. See supra note 104.
204. (Commun. No. 550/1993) (16 Dec. 1996) (58th Session), UN H.R. Comm., Doc. No.
CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 at 9.7.
205. The Commission on Human Rights, an abolished judicial body, had the task to protect
the Human Rights Court from an overload of complaints. If a complaint was rejected by the
Commission, there was no appeal. Where the Commission found a violation by a Contracting
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complaints against national courts. Glimmerven was sentenced to a twoweek prison term by Dutch courts for the distribution of leaflets advocating the expulsion of all Surinamers, most of them Dutch nationals,
from the Netherlands." His conviction was not found to be a violation
of Article 10, the free speech guarantee of the Convention. As Article
17 states: "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in the Convention." The Commission held that Article 17 allows
the prohibition of speech which advocates depriving others of their human rights." In a German case, the defendant had displayed pamphlets
on a notice board fixed to his garden fence describing the Holocaust as
an unacceptable lie and a Zionist swindle.' His neighbor, a Jew whose
grandfather had been murdered in Auschwitz, brought a private action
for defamation; the German Federal Court enjoined the defendant from
repeating these statements.1 0 The Commission affirmed, stating that the
untrue statement of fact defamed the plaintiff, as protection "may be especially indicated vis-A-vis groups which have historically suffered
from discrimination."211
The most important case went through the Commission to the Human Rights Court. Jersild, a Danish broadcasting journalist, invited
three members of the "Greenjackets," a skinhead gang, to present their
views on a television program discussing racism. During the interview,
they compared Turks and other foreigners with rats and called for their
expulsion and extermination. 12 The Danish courts punished not only the
speakers, but also Jersild for providing them with the forum of the electronic media. The Human Rights Court reversed his conviction finding
that reporting racist views of others without endorsing them is speech
state, this state could appeal the case to the Court. See Andrew Drzernczewski, The European
Rights Convention: A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as of November 1, 1998, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 697 (1998).
206. See Glimmerveen v. Netherlands 8348/78 D. & R. 187 (dec. Oct. 11, 1979).
207. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 211 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
208. See Glimmerveen, 8348/78 D.& R. at 195.
209. BGHZ 75, 160; see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
210. See id.
211. See X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 9235/81, 29 Eur. Comm'n H.R., D. &
R. 194, 198 (1982).
212. See Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
11 (1994), available at
<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/hudocNiewHtml.a...e=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0&X= 16194
655>; supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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protected by Article 10 of the Convention.
C. The "Common Ground" Between "MarginsofAppreciation"
The decisions in the prior section have been mentioned exclusively
for the purpose of showing how constitutional adjudication is able to resolve conflicts between free speech rights and rules protecting human
dignity. The widely differing solutions found in each of these opinions
are not intended to serve as models or examples to be strictly followed
by courts in other countries. It is not the intention of this Article to advocate for or recommend identical rules and results for all legal systems. Even within Europe, this would not work. In applying Article 10
of the Convention, the European Human Rights Court grants the courts
of the states who signed and ratified the Convention a "margin of appreciation" in order to allow them to take into account different cultural,
political, religious, and legal traditions.214 Such a margin is allowed, for
example, with regard to the impact of "morals" in obscenity cases"5 or
of national security in cases involving the publication of classified government information." 6 The "common ground" suggested in this article
should have a still more modest scope. International conventions like
Article 4 CERD2" 7 and Article 20 paragraph 2 CCPR2 indicate the need
to achieve, across borderlines and across oceans, a shared understanding
that a reasonable interpretation of free speech guarantees will allow the
prohibition of the most threatening emanations of racial hatred and dehumanizing propaganda. Such a common understanding would still allow each legal system to retain, in almost every respect, a very wide
margin of discretion. This would include the drafting of relevant statutes, the interpretation of reprehensible speech, the selection of cases to
be prosecuted, and-most importantly-the reading and the application
of the constitutional rules. But the "common ground" could help to fight
cross-border propaganda of racist violence. This would demonstrate that

213. Id.at 32.
214. See Dirk Voorhoof, The Media in a Democratic Society: Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MEDIA IN A
DEMOCRATIC SocIETY 39, 62-66 (Council of Europe/University of Ljubljana Faculty of Law eds.,
1995).
215. See Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); Case of Mffller and Others, 133
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
216. See Times Newspapers & Andrew Neil v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14644/89 (Report
of the Commission, October 8, 1991); Chorherr v. Austria, 266 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
217. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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the law is able to endorse highly abstract principles without forgetting
the victims.
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